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Abstract—Coercion resistance and receipt freeness are criti-
cal properties for any voting system. However, many definitions
of these properties have been proposed, with varying levels
of formality, and there has been little attempt to tie these
definitions together or identify relations between them.
We give here a general framework for specifying different
coercion resistance and receipt freeness properties using the
process algebra CSP. The framework is general enough to
accommodate a wide range of definitions, including dealing
with randomization attacks and forced abstention.
We provide models of some simple voting systems, and
show how the framework can be used to analyze these models
under different definitions of coercion resistance and receipt
freeness. Our formalisation highlights the variation between
the definitions in the literature.
I. INTRODUCTION
Much work has appeared in the academic literature over
the last couple of decades concerning secure voting proto-
cols. Many proposed systems have contained assertions that
they meet appropriate security guarantees; but the properties
that they are supposed to satisfy are often poorly defined,
and for the most part any proofs offered have been informal
at best.
More recently, there have been attempts to formalize some
of the desirable properties of voting systems [1], [2]. These
results have been useful, because they have been able to
give precise answers to previously vague questions about
the security of various systems. The approach has been to
construct a model, formalize the relevant property within the
model, and prove that the model satisfies the property.
However, since the informal definitions of these properties
vary considerably from one paper to another, these formal
definitions inevitably capture what is meant by some au-
thors’ use of the terms, and not others’; consequently, one
can debate whether the formalisms really have captured the
‘right’ understanding of the various properties.
Our approach here is a little different. We take two of
the commonly discussed properties—coercion resistance and
receipt freeness—and we construct a framework that is rich
enough to cope with a large variety of definitions. This
has the advantage of allowing one to formalize any of a
large number of definitions of these properties and analyze
a voting system to see which of the definitions it satisfies
and which it does not.
This paper begins with an overview of several definitions
of receipt freeness and coercion resistance found in the
literature. We then consider how to model voting systems
formally in CSP, and present a formal CSP framework for
describing coercion resistance and receipt freeness prop-
erties. We apply the framework to characterise several of
the properties from the literature. A simplified CSP model
of Preˆt a` Voter is then considered against a range of
coercion resistance properties expressed in our framework.
Two further examples of voting systems are presented to
highlight differences between definitions in the literature.
Finally we discuss receipt freeness properties, which are
treated as particular cases of coercion resistance.
A. Definitions
Definitions of coercion resistance and receipt freeness are
plentiful in the literature, but the definitions are often infor-
mal and ambiguous, and rarely do two definitions coincide.
In addition, the difference between coercion resistance and
receipt freeness is often unclear.
The following definitions are taken from the literature.
They are a mixture of definitions of coercion resistance and
receipt freeness; once we have seen the flavour of some
of these definitions, then we will consider the difference
between the two notions.
Definition 1 (Okamoto [RF]): For any two candidates c
and c′, a voter can vote for c in a way that is consistent (from
the coercer’s point of view) with having voted for c′ [3].
Definition 2 (Delaune/Kremer/Ryan [CR]): Coercion re-
sistance holds if a coerced voter behaving as instructed
is indistinguishable from one voting a different way, to a
coercer interacting with the voter [2]. (A weaker notion
of receipt freeness is also provided, where two ways of
voting are indistinguishable without an explicit coercer.)
This approach is extended in [4] to handle forced abstention
attacks explicitly. The epistemic approach of [5] takes a
similar view of coercion-resistance.
Definition 3 (Universal Composability [CR]): Coercion
resistance has also been characterised in the Universal
Composability framework, for example in [1], [6], [7], [8].
In this approach, a coercion resistant voting scheme includes
a definition of the coercion resistance strategy for voters
to follow if coerced, and the system is coercion-resistant
if an adversary cannot enable a distinguisher to tell the
difference between the real system and an idealised system
in which voters choose arbitrarily whether or not to obey
the coercer. Though in a different setting, this gives the
same sense of coercion-resistance as Definition 2.
Definition 4 (Benaloh/Tuinstra [RF]): A voter should be
unable to prove that a vote was cast in a particular way [9].
This definition can have at least two interpretations, but
we take ‘in a particular way’ to refer to the value of the
vote. In Preˆt a` Voter [10], for instance, a receipt with a tick
in the top box is not evidence of voting in any particular
way.
This still leaves the following two interpretations as
possibilities:
1) The voter should be unable to show that she voted for
a particular candidate c.
2) The voter should be unable to show that she did not
vote for a particular candidate c.
Note that the second is stronger than the first, and seems to
be the strongest interpretation. If a system meets the second,
then it must meet the first, for if a voter can show that she
voted for c, then she has thereby shown that she did not vote
for c′ != c.
For the purposes of this paper, we will use the second
interpretation.
Definition 5 (Chaum et al. [RF]): A voting system is re-
ceipt free if the receipt leaks no useful information [11].
The definition leaves a fair amount of room for manoeu-
vre: what qualifies as ‘useful information’? At one end of
the scale, a receipt that gives the full vote in plaintext is
clearly ruled out; at the other end, something like a Preˆt a`
Voter receipt or a ThreeBallot receipt [12], each of which is
consistent with a vote for any candidate, presumably does
not give useful information.
It seems reasonable to take this as requiring the receipt
not to provide the voter with a proof that she did not vote
for a particular candidate. The Chaum definition, under this
interpretation, is equivalent to the second interpretation of
Definition 4.
Definition 6 (Juels/Catalano/Jakobsson [CR]): A voting
system is coercion resistant if it “is one in which the user can
deceive the adversary into thinking that she has behaved as
instructed, when the voter has in fact cast a ballot according
to her own intentions.” [13]
The issue here is what can qualify as instruction. Since
the main thrust of this paper is to discuss different notions
of instruction and the consequent strength of the coercion
resistance property, this definition could be taken to encom-
pass many of the properties discussed in the paper.
The difference between coercion resistance and receipt
freeness is usually phrased in terms of the coercer’s ability
to interact with the voter during the voting process: coercion
resistance includes protection against a coercer who can
interact in this way, whereas receipt freeness does not. This
is a slippery distinction, for two reasons:
1) Interacting with the voter before the voting process,
and interacting during the voting process, are hard to
distinguish cleanly. For instance, there is nothing in
principle to stop the coercer from interacting before
voting takes place, and providing the voter with a
flowchart showing how the voter is to act in any given
situation.
2) It is not clear what constitutes interaction. If it is
known to me that someone is offering money for
receipts that show a vote for a particular candidate,
does the fact that the knowledge has reached me
(by whatever means) constitute interaction with the
coercer?
Since coercion resistance is generally considered to be a
stronger property than receipt freeness, the approach we will
take in this paper is to see receipt freeness properties as a
subclass of coercion resistance properties. We will assume
that receipt freeness deals with a coercer who is concerned
only with deducing information about how someone voted
from receipts and any public information, but who does not
give detailed instructions on how to cast the vote. Coercion
resistance, on the other hand, includes dealing with a coercer
who gives details not just on which candidate to vote for but
also on how to cast the vote.
This understanding of receipt freeness has the advantage
that it can be modelled in the same way as coercion
resistance. Receipt freeness, on this definition, is equivalent
to coercion resistance against a coercer who can specify
which candidate the voter should choose, but cannot specify
how the voter should make the choice. If the voting process
is deterministic (as it is, for example, in Preˆt a` Voter), then
these two notions will coincide, but if it is non-deterministic
(as, for example, in ThreeBallot) then they might not.
II. MODELLING IN CSP
A. CSP background
CSP describes systems in terms of processes, which
interact by means of synchronising on events. The set of all
events that a process P can engage in is called its alphabet,
written αP. Events can be structured, for example vote.i.v
may represent a voter i casting a vote v, or c.v represents
value v passing on channel c. The set {|c|} denotes the set
of all events of the form c.v. The set of all events is denoted
š .
The CSP language is used to describe processes. StopA
represents the process with alphabet A that cannot engage
in any events; A may be omitted when it is clear from the
context. Chaos(A) is the process with alphabet A that at
any stage of execution can nondeterministically perform or
refuse to perform events from A. Process a → P initially
performs a, and subsequently behaves as P. The input
process c?x : S→ P(x) can receive a value x ∈ S on channel
c, and then behave as P(x). The set S can also be expressed
as a predicate. The output process c!v→ P outputs value v
along channel c, and then behaves as P. $i Pi is an internal
choice: the process decides which of the Pi to behave as. It
also admits a binary form P $ Q. P ! Q offers an external
choice: it is prepared to behave as either P or Q, and the
choice is resolved by its environment. ‖i Pi is the ‘alphabet
parallel’ composition of the Pi. Occurrence of any event a
requires the synchronous participation of all processes which
have a in their alphabet. This operator also has a binary form
P ‖ Q. In the ‘interface parallel’ composition P ‖
X
Q, P and
Q must synchronise on all events in X, but perform other
events independently. P \ A behaves as P but with all events
from the set A hidden and performed internally. For an event
mapping f , the process f (P) behaves as P but performs f (a)
whenever P would perform a. Process definitions take the
form N = P, and can be recursive (i.e. the definition of P
contains N). N can also be parameterised.
CSP has several semantic models, which are appropriate
for capturing different aspects of process behaviour. In this
paper we use the Failures/Divergences model [14], [15],
since that model treats non-determinism, and divergence-
freedom. In the Failures/Divergences model, a process is
associated with two sets F and D, which are respectively
the failures and divergences of P. These are understood as
observations of possible executions of the process P, in terms
of the events from αP that it can engage in.
Divergences of a process are sequences of events which
lead to an infinite sequence of internal events. The set
divergences(P) is the set of all possible divergences for P.
In this paper we are generally dealing with divergence-free
processes: those for which the set divergences(P) is empty.
Stable failures are pairs (tr,X) consisting of a trace tr ∈
(αP)∗ and a set X ⊆ αP. This describes P performing the
sequence of events tr and then refusing to engage in any of
the events in X and being unable to make further internal
progress. The set failures(P) consists of the stable failures of
P, together with pairs (tr,X) for which tr is a divergence.
Since we will be dealing with divergence-free processes,
failures(P) will be the stable failures of P.
If P and Q have the same divergences and failures, then
we write P = FD Q.
Definition 7 (Deterministic): A process P is deterministic
if
∀ tr,X, a . (tr,X) ∈ failures(P) ∧ a ∈ X
⇒ (tr a 〈a〉, ∅) !∈ failures(P)
In this paper we will use failures-divergences refinement,
defined as follows:
Definition 8 (Refinement):
P -FD Q =̂ failures(Q) ⊆ failures(P)
∧ divergences(Q) ⊆ divergences(P)
We may also write Q .FD P for P -FD Q. Observe that if
P -FD Q and P is divergence-free, then Q is divergence-free.
Thus we use failures-divergences refinement throughout to
ensure that the refinements we consider for processes are
divergence-free.
The particular view of P -FD Q that we use through
this paper is that any behaviour of Q is consistent with,
or allowed by, P. In other words, an observer who sees Q
cannot tell that it is not P.
B. Voting systems
Throughout this section, we shall assume that voting
systems are modelled as follows. The system as a whole
is modelled by a process SYSTEM; this will be responsible
for receiving votes, publishing receipts, tallying, publishing
audit data, and whatever else the system in question may
need to do.
Voters will interact with the system by being placed
in parallel with it. We will model voter behaviour by a
process VOTER(i, c), which represents the most general
behaviour of a voter with ID i who chooses to vote for
candidate c.
Preferential voting systems allow voters to rank the candi-
dates, rather than asking them to choose one candidate. The
framework presented here is expressive enough to allow for
this: c would be the vote in whatever form it might take,
rather than necessarily being a specific candidate; or, in other
words, each possible ranking would effectively be treated as
a separate ‘candidate’. However, for clarity of exposition,
we will continue to talk in terms of votes for particular
candidates.
We will consider coercion resistance and receipt freeness
from the perspective of an arbitrarily chosen voter, to whom
we will give the name of Zara and the ID of 0. Thus,
roughly speaking, we will want to know whether a coercer
can distinguish SYSTEM ‖ VOTER(0, c) from SYSTEM ‖
VOTER(0, c′). In the first case, the target voter casts a vote
for c, and in the second case, he casts a vote for c′.
However, we start by observing that no voting system
can be coercion resistant from voter 0’s perspective if every
other voter is under the complete control of the coercer. The
coercer will know what the tally should be without voter 0’s
vote, and so he will be able to establish how voter 0 voted
by seeing how the tally has changed. For this reason, we
will need to assume that there is at least one other voter
who lies outside the control of the coercer. Since we will
need to reason about this voter, we will identify him by the
name of Juan and the ID of 1. This approach is also taken in
the formalisations of coercion resistance and receipt freeness
given in [2].
The idea will be that Juan will cover Zara’s tracks. For
example, consider the case where the coercer instructs Zara
to vote for Alice. Coercion resistance will mean that the
coercer is unable to distinguish between, on the one hand,
Zara’s compliance by voting for Alice and Juan’s voting
for Bob, and, on the other hand, Zara’s disobedience by
voting for Bob and Juan’s voting for Alice. The underlying
assumption in this example, then, is that there is at least one
voter (whom we will call Juan) who, as far as the coercer
is concerned, might or might not vote for Alice, but who
in fact does so. As long as at least one voter casts a vote
for Alice but is not known by the coercer to have done
so, then Zara’s non-compliance will be masked. The precise
masking behaviour will vary according to the voting system
and the model of coercion resistance; we will return later
to the question of how reasonable this assumption is for
different systems and models.
We now give a semi-formal definition of coercion re-
sistance within this framework. The definition will capture
all of the important aspects, but will leave ambiguities in
several places; these ambiguities will become parameters to
the formal CSP definition to allow us to construct formal
definitions of a wide range of notions of coercion resistance
and receipt freeness.
Definition 9 (Semi-formal): Suppose that Zara wants to
vote for candidate c. Whatever instructions the coercer gives
to Zara, there will be a behaviour Z of Zara that casts a vote
for c, and two behaviours J1 and J2 of Juan, such that, from
the coercer’s view of the system, Zara’s behaving according
to Z and Juan’s behaving according to J1 will be consistent
with Zara’s complying with the coercer’s instructions and
Juan’s behaving according to J2.
This definition implicitly gives us three important parame-
ters that can be altered to model different notions of coercion
resistance:
1) Coercer’s power. How precise can the coercer’s in-
structions be? For forms where the coercer does not
interact with the voter, the coercer will be able to
specify a candidate or a set of candidates for whom
the voter may vote, but not how the voter must do
so, whereas with general coercion resistance properties
the coercer may be able to specify precisely how the
vote is to be cast.
2) Abstraction. How much of the system behaviour can
the coercer see, and how much is hidden? For instance,
can the coercer see whether Zara has turned up to the
polling station? Much will depend on what behaviour
we hide from the coercer, and what behaviour we
leave.
3) Abstention. Might Zara want to abstain? Might the
coercer try to force Zara to abstain?
We are now ready to state the formal definition. We start
with some assumptions on the model of the system and the
model of a general voter.
Definition 10 (Candidates): We denote the set of all can-
didates by CANDIDATES. This set includes the special
value abs; a voter who ‘chooses’ the candidate abs chooses
to abstain from voting.
Assumption 1 (System model): The system is modelled
by a process SYSTEM, and the most general behaviour of
an individual voter with ID i who chooses to vote for candi-
date c is modelled by a process VOTER(i, c). Voter behaviour
is also defined for a set of candidates: the most general
behaviour of a voter who chooses non-deterministically from
the set CANDS != ∅ of candidates is defined by
VOTER(i,CANDS) = $
c∈CANDS
VOTER(i, c)
These processes must meet the conditions set out in
Figure 1.
One consequence of these assumptions is that voter be-
haviour and overall system behaviour are both finitary. This
rules out, for instance, unbounded auditing of ballot papers
in a system like Preˆt a` Voter [16], or unbounded re-voting in
a system like Helios [17]. This is not unreasonable, since in
practice polling closes at a fixed time, meaning that systems
and voters must eventually terminate their interaction.
What is more important from a technical point of view
is that it eliminates the possibility of divergence in any of
the processes involved in the model. When we consider
the coercer’s view of the system, we will abstract away
all of the events that the coercer cannot see; if unbounded
sequences of such events were allowed, then the abstraction
would introduce divergence. By ensuring that every process
is divergence free, we will be able to analyze the model in
stable failures without concerning ourselves with divergence.
Definition 11 (Coercer’s control): We use ‘H’ to denote
the set of events hidden from the coercer’s view. The only
restriction on this set is that {open, close} ∩ H = ∅; in
other words, the coercer must be able to see the opening
and closing of the election.
Definition 12 (Candidates and abstentions): The set of
all candidates under consideration is denoted by ‘C’. This
will denote all the candidates for whom Zara may wish
to vote, and all of the candidates for whom the coercer
may wish her to vote. Typically we will have either C =
CANDIDATES \ {abs}, if we do not want to consider
abstentions, or C = CANDIDATES if we do.
We now define the set of all instructions the coercer might
give Zara. Instructions will come in the form of a process
whose behaviour Zara must mimic; for compliance to be
possible, the process must be a refinement of VOTER(0,C),
Zara’s most general behaviour.
Definition 13: We use ‘I’ to denote the set of instructions
that the coercer might give Zara. It must be a subset of the
set of all possible instructions that the coercer could give
Zara, with the set C of candidates under consideration; in
other words:
I ⊆ {P | P .FD VOTER(0,C)}
Definition 14 (Coercion resistance [CR)]): Suppose that
we are given some system model SYSTEM (with associated
voter model VOTER(i, c)).
Figure 1 Assumptions on the system model
SYSTEM \ ( š \ {open, close}) = FD open→ close→ Stop
VOTER(i,CANDIDATES) \ ( š \ {open, close}) = FD open→ close→ Stop
SYSTEM ‖ ( ‖
i∈IDS
VOTER(i,CANDIDATES)) \ ( š \ {open, close}) = FD open→ close→ Stop
We say that SYSTEM meets CR(I,C,H), with
I ⊆ {P | P .FD VOTER(0,C)}
C ⊆ CANDIDATES
H ⊆ š \ {open, close}
if1, for all c ∈ C and Zx ∈ I, there exist some Zc .FD
VOTER(0, c) and Jx .FD J such that
LH (SYSTEM ‖ Zx ‖ J) -FD LH (SYSTEM ‖ Zc ‖ Jx)
In this definition, J is a shorthand for VOTER(1,C),
Juan’s most general behaviour. The set I represents the
set of processes that the coercer is able to choose from
when giving instructions to Zara; we must have I ⊆ {P |
P .FD VOTER(0,C)} if Zara is to be able to comply. The
second parameter, C, determines the set of candidates under
consideration; in particular, the flavour of coercion resistance
will change if this contains the special abs candidate. If
abs ∈ C, then Zara must be able to abstain if she so wishes,
and the coercer may try to force her to abstain.
The coercer’s view is controlled by the third parameter,
H. The LH function is lazy abstraction, and is defined in
[14]; it provides a mechanism for masking all of the events
(in traces and in refusals) from the hidden set H. It is defined
as LH (P) = (P ‖
H
Chaos(H)) \ H. Essentially, by applying
lazy abstraction over the set H, we ensure that events from
the set H are invisible, so that the coercer can neither see
such events nor see the refusal to engage in such events.
What Definition 14 states, then, is that whatever candi-
date c Zara wishes to vote for, and whatever instructions Zx
the coercer might give her from the set I, there is some
possible behaviour Zc of hers that casts a vote for c, and
some possible behaviour Jx of Juan, such that, when we
abstract away the set of all hidden events H, any behaviour
of the system when Zara acts as Zc and Juan acts as Jx is
also a possible behaviour of the system when Zara acts as
instructed by the coercer.
An alternative definition replaces the refinement relation
with equality:
1We have stated Definition 14 in terms of refinement in the failures-
divergences model, because we need to take care throughout our modelling
that processes never diverge. However, our assumptions on SYSTEM and
VOTER(0,CANDIDATES) mean that neither side of the refinement can in
fact diverge, so, in practice, checking refinement in the stable failures model
is sufficient here.
Definition 15 (Coercion resistance [CR∗]): Suppose that
we are given some system model SYSTEM (with associated
voter model VOTER(i, c)).
We say that SYSTEM meets CR∗(I,C,H), with
I ⊆ {P | P .FD VOTER(0,C)}
C ⊆ CANDIDATES
H ⊆ š \ {open, close}
if, for all c ∈ C and Zx ∈ I, there exist some Zc .FD
VOTER(0, c), Jx .FD J, and Jc .FD VOTER(1, c) such that
LH (SYSTEM ‖ Zx ‖ Jc) = FD LH (SYSTEM ‖ Zc ‖ Jx)
The difference between Definitions 14 and 15 is that in
the former, the question is whether some strategy of Zara’s
is sufficient to allow her to vote according to her own
wishes whilst claiming plausibly to have obeyed the coercer,
whereas in the latter, the question is whether every observa-
tion that the coercer might make of a compliant voter is also
possible for a voter voting for c. Definition 15 is stronger
than Definition 14 since equality implies refinement.
For most voting systems there will be no difference; but
we will see in Section IV-B1 that this is not always the case.
Some of the informal definitions, such as that of Juels,
Catalano and Jakobsson and that of Okamoto, are phrased
more in line with Definition 14; some others, such as that
of Delaune, Kremer and Ryan, and that of Benaloh and
Tuinstra, seem to call for Definition 15. Either approach is
defensible; and since the purpose of this paper is to give the
flexibility to formalize as many different notions as possible,
we give both definitions.
The line we will adopt here is to use Definition 14 for
the bulk of our work, to illustrate how the definition can be
applied. Similar results hold for Definition 15.
III. DEFINITIONS OF COERCION RESISTANCE
In this section, we will give formal definitions within
our framework of several different informal definitions of
coercion resistance and receipt freeness, including some of
those found in Section I-A. In each case, we will give the
definition of the set I of instructions that the coercer can
give. This set will be defined in terms of C, the set of
candidates under consideration. We will then give a useful
result that allows us to compare definitions; this will enable
us to set up a hierarchy of definitions of coercion resistance
and receipt freeness.
Since the definitions are in terms of the set I of instruc-
tions, they can apply equally to CR and to CR∗.
A. Formal definitions
For convenience, we will attach a superscript of ‘abs’
whenever the definition includes the special abstention can-
didate. The definitions below are given in their undecorated
form, as if abstentions were not allowed; but later we will
use the decorated forms of some of these definitions when
we want to consider abstentions.
One notion of coercion resistance that is not given a
formal definition below is that of resistance to randomization
attacks, in which the coercer attempts to force Zara to vote
randomly. This type of attack can occur in a system like Preˆt
a` Voter, where the coercer can insist that Zara bring back a
receipt with a cross in the top box, without the coercer know-
ing which candidate the top box will represent. The formal
definition of such attacks varies according to the system in
question, so we cannot give a general definition, but we will
discuss randomization attacks further in Section IV-A.
We have not yet formalized the notion of receipt freeness,
but all the definitions below may be considered as general
coercion resistance properties (of which receipt freeness
properties are a subclass). We will return later to which coer-
cion resistance properties are also receipt freeness properties.
We start with the definition of a general kind of receipt
freeness property, in the context of a voter who wishes to
deceive the coercer where possible.
Definition 16 (Receipt absence): Our informal definition
of receipt absence allows the coercer to specify the content
of the vote, but not how to cast the vote. In its most general
form, the coercer may specify any non-empty subset X of
candidates, and require the voter to cast the vote for a
candidate from X. The set of instructions that the coercer
may give, then, is
IRFGEN = {VOTER(0,X) | X ⊆ C ∧ X != ∅}
We shall shortly give some results that enable us to say
when one definition is stronger than another (in the sense
that any system that meets the stronger property also meets
the weaker property).
Definition 17 (Okamoto): The Okamoto definition (Defi-
nition 1) is captured by
IOK = {VOTER(0, c) | c ∈ C}
Essentially, the coercer may specify a candidate to vote for,
but may not specify how the voter is to cast it.
This turns out (Proposition 1) to be equivalent to IRFGEN .
Definition 18 (Benaloh/Tuinstra): We here give the for-
mal definition of coercion resistance for the second inter-
pretation of Definition 4. This holds when a voter aiming
to deceive the coercer can avoid leaking information about
how the vote was cast.
The Benaloh/Tuinstra definition is captured by
IBT = {P | P . VOTER(0, c) ∧ c ∈ C}
This is stronger than the Okamoto definition. Here, the
coercer can require specific evidence that Zara has complied
with specific instructions not just on voting for c but on
voting for c in a particular way.
Definition 19 (Delaune/Kremer/Ryan): Definition 2 says
that a system is coercion resistant if the coercer cannot
tell whether a coerced voter has behaved as instructed or
voted a different way. This leaves open the question of what
possible instructions the coercer may give, but it appears
that in their model a coercer’s instructions must always be
instructions to vote for a particular candidate, possibly in a
specific way. The formal definition within our framework is
then the same as the Benaloh/Tuinstra definition: the coercer
can choose any candidate, then give instructions in the form
of any refinement of the process that always casts a vote
for that candidate. Note that Delaune, Kremer and Ryan use
observational equivalence, so CR∗ will be the appropriate
definition corresponding to their definition.
Definition 20 (Chaum): We argued in Section I-A that it
is reasonable to take Chaum’s definition as equivalent to that
of Benaloh/Tuinstra. The formal definition is then also the
same:
ICHAUM = IBT
Definition 21 (Forced abstention attacks): A forced ab-
stention attack is an attack in which the coercer attempts
to force Zara to abstain. Since it makes sense only when
abstentions are under consideration, we give the formal
definition in its decorated form:
Iabs = {VOTER(0, abs)}
This definition makes the assumption that abstaining is
deterministic. If there were a voting system that allowed
for non-deterministic ways of abstaining, we could model
this as the set of all refinements of VOTER(0, abs). But
since abstention usually involves refraining from taking any
action, it seems reasonable to model it as deterministic.
Definition 22 (Maximum strength): Our framework finds
its strongest possible notion of coercion resistance in the
set of all refinements of Zara’s most general behaviour,
VOTER(0,C). This includes everything covered by Be-
naloh/Tuinstra, but it also includes randomization attacks,
and any other sort of instruction that Zara is able to follow:
for instance, an instruction to use the last digit of the ballot
serial number to determine which candidate to vote for.
When abs ∈ C, it also includes instructions to abstain, or
instructions to participate.
IMAX = {P | P .FD VOTER(0,C)}
Figure 2 Hierarchy of definitions of coercion resistance
IabsMAX
IabsBT
IabsOK
IMAX
IBT
IOK
IabsRND
IRND
Iabs
IabsRFGEN
IRFGEN
Receipt freeness specifications below the line
Non-receipt freeness specifications above the line
B. Relationships between definitions
Some of these definitions are stronger than others. We
now state some results that allow us to formalize relations
between notions of coercion resistance.
Definition 23 (Dominance): Suppose that I1 and I2 are
sets of processes. We say that I1 dominates I2 if
∀P2 ∈ I2.∃P1 ∈ I1.P2 -FD P1
Theorem 1 (CR and dominance): Suppose that I1 domi-
nates I2, and SYSTEM meets CR(I1,C,H). Then SYSTEM
also meets CR(I2,C,H).
Proof: See appendix.
Corollary 1 (CR and subset): Suppose that I2 ⊆ I1, and
SYSTEM meets CR(I1,C,H). Then SYSTEM also meets
CR(I2,C,H).
Proof: If I2 ⊆ I1, then I1 dominates I2. So Theorem 1
applies, and we conclude that SYSTEM meets CR(I2,C,H).
These results allow us to give a hierarchy of definitions.
The diagram in Figure 2 shows the relationships among
the various formal definitions. An arrow from IX to IY
indicates that IX is stronger than IY . In most cases, this is the
consequence of a simple subset relationship: IY ⊆ IX . The
only cases where the relationship is more complex is that
of IOK and IRFGEN (with or without abs decoration), where
the arrow is double-headed because it turns out that these
definitions are equivalent.
Proposition 1 (Okamoto and IRFGEN): For any C and H,
the two properties CR(IOK ,C,H) and CR(IRFGEN ,C,H) are
equivalent.
Proof: IOK ⊆ IRFGEN , so by Corollary 1, any system
that meets IRFGEN meets IOK .
However, any element taken from IRFGEN is of the form
VOTER(0,X) for some X ⊆ C, with X != ∅. Let us now
choose some x ∈ X. Now VOTER(0, x) is in IOK , and
VOTER(0,X) -FD VOTER(0, x). So IOK dominates IRFGEN .
Thus, by Theorem 1, we conclude that any system that meets
IOK meets IRFGEN .
So the two definitions are equivalent.
IV. EXAMPLES
In this section, we show how this framework can be used
to analyze various different notions of coercion resistance
and receipt freeness for various different system models.
A. Simplified Preˆt a` Voter
The CSP code for a simplified model of Preˆt a` Voter,
running a referendum, is shown in Figure 3. Voters receive
a value b ∈ {0, 1} on channel ballot, which indicates the
ordering of the boxes on the ballot form: a value of 0
indicates that the top box represents ‘no’, and a value of
1 means that the top box represents ‘yes’. They then submit
an ID from the finite set IDS of all voter IDs, and a value v,
which indicates which box they would like to select, with
a value of 0 representing the top box; the system returns
v to them, and then increments either the ‘yes’ total or the
‘no’ total. Finally, when voting closes, the two totals are
announced.
Here, and throughout, ‘¼v’ represents 1 ⊕ v, where ‘⊕’ is
bitwise exclusive-or. (The special candidate abs is treated
as invariant under this operation.)
This model intentionally abstracts away the cryptography,
the mix servers, and the auditing.
The finitary condition (Assumption 1) for the voter pro-
cess is clear from the fact that it is non-recursive. The system
is finite because on each recursive step the number of people
who have voted strictly increases, and cannot exceed # IDS.
Our Preˆt a` Voter model is rich enough to allow for analysis
under various definitions of coercion resistance. We consider
several here. Initially, we will not take into account the
possibility that Zara or Juan might want to abstain, or the
possibility that the coercer might insist on abstention.
Proposition 2 (Okamoto and PaV, no abs): The set of
candidates under consideration, when abstentions are not
taken into account, is C2 = {0, 1}. (Later, we will ask what
happens if we include abstentions.)
The Okamoto definition in this setting is encapsulated by
IOK = {VOTER(0, c) | c ∈ C2}
Suppose that we set HPUB = {|ballot|}. In other words,
the coercer cannot see the ordering of the names on the
ballot paper (the ballot channel), but can see who arrives to
vote (the arrive channel) and who ticks which box (the vote
channel). We use the name ‘HPUB’ because this models a
scenario in which it is made public which voter is associated
with each encrypted receipt.
We claim that the simplified Preˆt a` Voter model meets
CR(IOK ,C2,HPUB).
Figure 3 A simplified model of Preˆt a` Voter: defining the system and voter behaviour
SYSTEM = open→ WAITING(∅, 0, 0)
WAITING(VOTED, y, n) = arrive?id : IDS \ VOTED→ VOTING(VOTED, y, n, id)
! close→ announce.y.n→ Stop
VOTING(VOTED, y, n, id) = $
b∈{0,1}
ballot.id!b→ vote.id?v→ write!v
→ WAITING(VOTED ∪ {id}, y + (v⊕ b), n + (¼v⊕ b))
VOTER(i, c) = open→ if (c != abs) then
arrive!i→ ballot.i?b→ vote.i.(c⊕ b) → close→ Stop
else
close→ Stop
Proof: We are required to show that, given c ∈ C2 and
Zx ∈ IOK , there is some Zc .FD VOTER(0, c) and Jx .FD J
such that
LHPUB (SYSTEM ‖ Zx ‖ J) -FD LHPUB (SYSTEM ‖ Zc ‖ Jx)
We start by stating a useful result.
Lemma 1 (Abstraction and renaming): If f is a renaming
function that leaves all events outside H unchanged, and
f−1(f (H)) = H, then
LH (f (P)) = FD Lf (H)(P)
Proof: See Appendix.
Corollary 2 (Abstraction and renaming): If f is a bijec-
tive renaming function that leaves all events outside H
unchanged, then
LH (f (P)) = FD LH (P)
Proof: If f is bijective and leaves events outside H
unchanged, then it is also bijective on H, and so f (H) = H,
and f−1(f (H)) = H. Thus, by Lemma 1,
LH (f (P)) = FD LH (P)
Now we are in a position to prove Proposition 2.
Fix some c ∈ C2. Evidently the case where Zx =
VOTER(0, c) causes us no trouble: this represents the co-
ercer’s attempt to force Zara to vote for the candidate c she
already wanted to vote for. In this case, Zc = Zx and Jx = J
will suffice—or, in other words, Zara obeys the coercer and
still casts her vote for her preferred candidate.
Now suppose that Zx = VOTER(0,¼c). Zara wishes to vote
for c, but the coercer has instructed her to vote for ¼c. We
set Zc = VOTER(0, c) and Jx = VOTER(1,¼c).
Now we are required to check that
LHPUB (SYSTEM ‖ VOTER(0,¼c) ‖ J)
-FD
LHPUB (SYSTEM ‖ VOTER(0, c) ‖ VOTER(1,¼c)) (1)
This can be mechanically checked in FDR with a rea-
sonably small set of IDs, for each of the two values of c.
However, it is clear that the relation holds in any case. Nei-
ther VOTER’s behaviour nor SYSTEM’s behaviour depends
in any way on the IDs, except for the equality check implicit
in the restriction that voters may vote only once. In other
words, if pi is a permutation on IDs, and fpi is a renaming
function that simply changes each ID i to pi(i):
fpi (arrive.i) = arrive.pi(i)
fpi (ballot.i) = ballot.pi(i)
fpi (vote.i) = vote.pi(i)
fpi (x) = x (x /∈ {|arrive, ballot, vote|})
then
fpi (VOTER(i,CANDS)) = VOTER(pi(i),CANDS)
fpi (SYSTEM) = SYSTEM
Now let pi be the permutation that swaps 0 and 1, and
leaves all other IDs unchanged. Then
fpi (SYSTEM ‖ VOTER(0, c) ‖ VOTER(1,¼c))
= SYSTEM ‖ fpi (VOTER(0, c)) ‖ fpi (VOTER(1,¼c))
= SYSTEM ‖ VOTER(1, c) ‖ VOTER(0,¼c)
= SYSTEM ‖ VOTER(0,¼c) ‖ VOTER(1, c)
In other words, the effect of switching Zara’s vote with
Juan’s vote is only to swap over their IDs wherever they
appear.
Applying fpi−1 to both sides, we have that
SYSTEM ‖ VOTER(0, c) ‖ VOTER(1,¼c)
= fpi−1 (SYSTEM ‖ VOTER(0,¼c) ‖ VOTER(1, c))
So Equation 1 now becomes:
LHPUB (SYSTEM ‖ VOTER(0,¼c) ‖ J)
-FD
LHPUB (fpi−1 (SYSTEM ‖ VOTER(0,¼c) ‖ VOTER(1, c)))
It is clear that if we were to remove the lazy abstraction
and the renaming then the right-hand side would be a
refinement of the left, simply because VOTER(1, c) is a
refinement of J. But the renaming only affects events that
are in HPUB, and fpi−1 is bijective, so we can appeal to
Corollary 2 to establish the result.
We now consider forced randomization attacks. In such
an attack, the coercer does not attempt to force the voter
to cast a vote for a specific candidate, but ‘neutralizes’ the
vote by forcing the voter to cast a random vote. This type of
attack could be employed in, for instance, districts believed
to favour the coercer’s main rival.
Proposition 3 (Randomization attacks and PaV, no abs):
To mount a randomization attack under Preˆt a` Voter, the
coercer specifies a particular box to be ticked (for instance,
the top box). The coercer has no means of knowing whether
this box represents a ‘yes’ vote or a ‘no’ vote.
Such an attack is represented in our model by setting
IRND = {open→ arrive!0→ ballot.0?b→
vote.i.v→ close→ Stop
| v ∈ {0, 1}}
As before, we consider candidates in C2 = {0, 1} and an
abstraction of HPUB = {|ballot|}. The coercer can see which
box Zara ticks, but not which candidate the box represents.
We claim that our simplified model of Preˆt a` Voter does
not meet CR(IRND,C2,HPUB).
Proof: We are required to show that, for some c ∈ C2
and Zx ∈ IRND, there do not exist Zc .FD VOTER(0, c) and
Jx .FD J such that
LHPUB (SYSTEM ‖ Zx ‖ J) -FD LHPUB (SYSTEM ‖ Zc ‖ Jx)
Let us set c = 0 and
Zx = open→ arrive!0→ ballot.0?b→
vote.0.0→ close→ Stop
In other words, Zara wants to vote ‘no’, and the coercer
insists that she tick the top box.
The first point to observe is that VOTER(0, c) is deter-
ministic, and since the only refinement of a deterministic
process in the failures-divergences model is itself, the only
possible choice for Zc is VOTER(0, c).
However, t = 〈open, arrive.0, ballot.0.1, vote.0.1〉 is a
possible trace of VOTER(0, c). This represents Zara’s being
given a ballot form with ‘yes’ at the top, and voting ‘no’
by ticking the bottom box. SYSTEM also has t as a possible
trace.
Whatever the choice of Jx, it must allow t ¼ α(Jx) =
〈open〉. It cannot block any of the other events in the trace,
since they lie outside its alphabet.
Therefore, t is a trace of SYSTEM ‖ Zc ‖ Jx. The effect
of the abstraction is to hide the ballot event, but not block
the others. So t′ = 〈open, arrive.0, vote.0.1〉 is a trace of the
right-hand side.
However, t′ is not a trace of the left-hand side. The
vote.0.1 event is in the alphabet of Zx, so if it were to occur,
it would have to appear in a trace of Zx. But one can see
from the definition of Zx that it never engages in such an
event.
So t′ is a trace of the right-hand side but not of the left-
hand side. The refinement therefore does not hold, and the
system does not meet CR(IRND,C2,HPUB).
Corollary 3 (IMAX and PaV, no abs): It is an immediate
corollary of Proposition 3 and Corollary 1 that our simplified
Preˆt a` Voter does not meet CR(IMAX,C2,HPUB). Any set of
coercer instructions must be a subset of IMAX , so Corollary 1
tells us that if Preˆt a` Voter met CR(IMAX,C2,HPUB) then it
would meet CR(I,C2,HPUB) for any I. But Proposition 3
shows that it does not meet CR(IRND,C2,HPUB); therefore,
it cannot meet CR(IMAX,C2,HPUB).
We now return to the question of abstentions. In what
follows, we will use Cabs2 = C2∪{abs}, and establish what
effect this has on coercion resistance. Including abs has two
consequences:
1) Zara may now want to abstain; coercion resistance
will imply that she is able to abstain if she wants to,
without the coercer knowing that she has not voted
according to instructions. If the coercer can force Zara
not to abstain, then we have a forced participation
attack.
2) The coercer may insist on Zara’s abstention; coercion
resistance will imply that she is able to vote if she
wants to, without the coercer knowing that she has
not abstained. If the coercer can force Zara to abstain,
then we have a forced abstention attack.
The model is rich enough to handle these cases indepen-
dently. However, they are naturally treated together, and we
will treat them together here.
Proposition 4 (Okamoto and PaV, Cabs2 ): The Okamoto
definition, with abs included, is modelled by
IabsOK = {VOTER(0, c) | c ∈ Cabs2 }
By including abs in the set of candidates, we also allow for
the possibility that Zara wishes to abstain. We continue to
set HPUB = {|ballot|}, so that the coercer can see all voter
actions but cannot see the candidate ordering on the ballot
paper.
We claim that our simplified Preˆt a` Voter model does not
meet CR(IabsOK ,C
abs
2 ,HPUB).
Proof: Let us set c = 0, and
Zx = VOTER(0, abs) = open→ close→ Stop
indicating that Zara wishes to vote ‘yes’, but the coercer
insists that she should abstain.
We now need to show that there do not exist Zc .FD
VOTER(0, 0) and Jx .FD J such that
LHPUB (SYSTEM ‖ VOTER(0, abs) ‖ J)
-FD
LHPUB (SYSTEM ‖ Zc ‖ Jx)
As before, VOTER(0, 0) is deterministic, so we must
have Zc = VOTER(0, 0). But VOTER(0, 0) has t =
〈open, arrive.0〉 as a trace. This is also a trace of SYSTEM,
and t ¼ α(J) = 〈open〉, which is a trace of all refinements
of J. Neither of the events in t is abstracted away by HPUB,
so t is a trace of the right-hand side.
It cannot, however, be a trace of the left-hand side. The
event arrive.0 is blocked from occurring by VOTER(0, abs),
which never engages in this event. So Preˆt a` Voter does not
meet CR(IabsOK ,C
abs
2 ,HPUB).
This is what we should have expected. If the coercer
can see voters arriving, or can see voters’ receipts, or
anything that includes the voter’s ID, then there is no hope
of resistance to forced abstention attacks.
Corollary 4 (IabsMAX and PaV, C
abs
2 ): The strongest defini-
tion, with abs included, is modelled by
IabsMAX = {P | P .FD VOTER(0, c) | c ∈ Cabs2 }
We claim that our simplified Preˆt a` Voter model does not
meet CR(IabsMAX,C
abs
2 ,HPUB).
Proof: This is an immediate consequence of Propo-
sition 4 and Corollary 1. Since the model does not meet
CR(IabsOK ,C
abs
2 ,HPUB), and IabsOK ⊆ IabsMAX , the model does not
meet CR(IabsMAX,C
abs
2 ,HPUB) either.
Our final consideration with our Preˆt a` Voter model is to
ask what happens if we change the level of abstraction, so
that the coercer can see fewer events. In particular, we will
alter the abstraction so that the coercer can see votes being
posted up (on the write channel), but not arrivals or vote
casting. We will set HSEC = {|arrive, ballot, vote|}.
Proposition 5 (IMAX and PaV, Cabs2 , HSEC): Our simpli-
fied Preˆt a` Voter model meets CR(IMAX,Cabs2 ,HSEC). In other
words, when all events containing voter IDs are abstracted
away, our model satisfies the strongest possible definition of
coercion resistance in our framework.
Proof: The proof closely parallels that of Proposition 2.
Fix some c ∈ Cabs2 , and some Zx .FD VOTER(0,Cabs2 ).
Now we set Zc = VOTER(0, c), and Jx = fpi (Zx). The
function fpi is exactly as in Proposition 2: it simply swaps
all occurrences of Zara’s ID for Juan’s, and vice versa.
We are required to show that
LHSEC (SYSTEM ‖ Zx ‖ J) -FD LHSEC (SYSTEM ‖ Zc ‖ fpi (Zx))
Corollary 2 and the bijective nature of fpi tell us that
LHSEC (SYSTEM ‖ Zc ‖ fpi (Zx))
= LHSEC (fpi−1 (SYSTEM ‖ Zc ‖ fpi (Zx)))
= LHSEC (SYSTEM ‖ fpi−1 (Zc) ‖ Zx)
= LHSEC (SYSTEM ‖ Zx ‖ fpi−1 (Zc))
But
fpi−1 (Zc) = fpi−1 (VOTER(0, c))
= VOTER(1, c)
.FD VOTER(1,Cabs2 )
= J
and so, by the monotonicity of the standard CSP operators,
LHSEC (SYSTEM ‖ Zx ‖ J) -FD LHSEC (SYSTEM ‖ Zc ‖ fpi (Zx))
It is evident from this one example that the framework we
have constructed is able to handle a wide variety of notions
of coercion resistance, by varying the values of I, C and H.
A summary of results is shown in Table I.
B. Further Examples
Two further examples illustrate the differences between
various types of coercion resistance. ‘Two-receipt’ shows
the difference between the definitions of Okamoto (where it
holds) and Benaloh/Tuinstra (where it does not hold). ‘Opt-
receipt’ shows the difference between the two characterisa-
tions of coercion resistance, CR and CR∗.
1) Two-receipt: This system allows voters to obtain a
receipt containing two names (listed in arbitrary order),
consisting of the candidate who received the vote and one
other candidate of the voter’s choice. The intention is that
the inclusion of an alternative name on the receipt allows
the voter to mask who received her vote. This system is
described in Figure 4. The running tally is maintained by
a bag (multiset) t containing the votes cast so far. The
receipt is modelled as write.id.{c, c′}. Then SYSTEM2 meets
the property CR(IOK , {c1, c2, c3}, {|vote, dummy|}). A voter
instructed to vote for c′ can vote for c in a way consistent
with a vote for c′. The initial parameters of SYSTEM2 are
the empty set (of voters who have so far voted), and the
empty bag (of votes cast so far).
Conversely, SYSTEM2 does not meet the Benaloh and
Tuinstra characterisation as captured by the property
Table I Summary of results for simplified Preˆt a` Voter model
Definition Abstentions? Invisible events Formalism Met by Preˆt a` Voter?
Okamoto No {|ballot|} CR(IOK ,C2,HPUB) Yes
Randomization No {|ballot|} CR(IRND,C2,HPUB) No
Strongest possible No {|ballot|} CR(IMAX,C2,HPUB) No
Okamoto / forced abstention Yes {|ballot|} CR(IabsOK ,Cabs2 ,HPUB) No
Strongest possible Yes {|ballot|} CR(IabsMAX,Cabs2 ,HPUB) No
Strongest possible Yes {|arrive, ballot, vote|} CR(IabsMAX,Cabs2 ,HSEC) Yes
Figure 4 A model of Two-receipt
SYSTEM2 = open→ WAITING2(∅, * +)
WAITING2(VOTED, t) = arrive?id : IDS \ VOTED→ VOTING2(VOTED, t, id)
! close→ announce!t → Stop
VOTING2(VOTED, t, id) = vote.id?v→ dummy.id?v′ : {v′ != v}→ write.id!{v, v′}→ WAITING2(VOTED ∪ {id}, t unionmulti *v+)
VOTER2(id, c) = open→ arrive!id → vote.id.c→ $
c′ %=c
dummy.id.c′ → write.id.{c, c′}→ close→ Stop
CR(IBT , {c1, c2, c3}, {|vote, dummy|}). To see this, consider
the case where the voter wishes to vote for c = c3, and the
coercer’s instruction is Zx = vote.0.c1 → dummy.0.c2 →
write.0.{c1, c2} → close → Stop. There is no Zc3 .FD
VOTER(0, c3) and Jx .FD J which satisfy the conditions
of Definition 14 (coercion resistance). In particular, for any
Zc3 and Jx the refinement condition will not hold:
LH (SYSTEM2 ‖ Zx ‖ J) !-FD LH (SYSTEM2 ‖ Zc3 ‖ Jx)
The right hand side must include a trace containing
write.0.{c3, c′} for some c′, since this will be generated by
Zc3 ; but no such trace is possible for the left-hand side.
This consistent with our expectations. A voter is able to
vote for her preferred candidate c in a way consistent with
a vote for c′, as required by Okamoto’s definition. On the
other hand, if the coercer can require a vote to be cast
in a particular way, then the voter might not be able to
vote in her preferred way consistent with this. Our formal
characterisation captures this distinction.
2) Opt-receipt: The following example is attributed to
Ron Rivest [18]. On accepting a vote, the system chooses
whether or not to offer a receipt. If offered, the voter chooses
whether or not to accept the receipt. Hence the voter might
obtain a receipt of exactly how they voted. However, they
can also vote for their preferred candidate in a way consistent
with any instructions a coercer might give them, by declining
any receipt, and claiming that the system did not offer one.
Our model of the Opt-receipt system is given in Fig-
ure 5. It meets CR(IMAX,C,HOPT ), where we set HOPT =
{|vote, noreceipt, offerreceipt, yes, no|}. This captures the
sense that the voter has a strategy for voting without
production of a receipt, and this is indeed true for SYSTEM3.
However, the system does not meet CR∗(IMAX,C,HOPT ),
or even CR(IOK ,C,HOPT ). In particular, if Zx =
VOTER(0, c′) and c != c′ then there is no Zc .FD
VOTER(0, c), Jx . J and Jc .FD VOTER(1, c) such that
LHOPT (SYSTEM3 ‖ Zx ‖ Jc) -FD LHOPT (SYSTEM3 ‖ Zc ‖ Jx)
The reason this equivalence cannot hold is that the event
write.0.c′ is in a possible trace of the left-hand side, so the
equivalence condition requires that the right-hand process
must allow the same trace. However, Zc cannot perform
write.0.c′ (since c != c′), and nor can Jx, so the trace is
not possible for the right-hand side.
This example thus highlights the difference between CR,
which requires the existence of a coercion resistance strategy
for a voter, and CR∗, which requires that information about
the vote should not leak whatever the voter does.
3) Num-receipt: In this example, when casting a vote,
the voter also provides an arbitrary number to be associated
with that vote. The system posts all of the votes and their
associated numbers onto a public bulletin board. The voter
does not obtain any separate receipt.
Such a system allows a coercer to provide a voter with a
value to use that is unlikely to be chosen by any other voter.
The coercer requires that value to appear on the bulletin
board against the candidate of the coercer’s choice.
The system fails coercion-resistance in the case where a
coercer can communicate with the voter before the end of the
Figure 5 A model of Opt-receipt
SYSTEM3 = open→ WAITING3(∅, * +)
WAITING3(VOTED, t) = arrive?id : IDS \ VOTED→ VOTING3(VOTED, t, id)
! close→ announce!t → Stop
VOTING3(VOTED, t, id) = vote.id?v→
noreceipt.id → WAITING3(VOTED ∪ {id}, t unionmulti *v+)
$ offerreceipt.id → (yes.id → write.id!v→ WAITING3(VOTED ∪ {id}, t unionmulti *v+))
! no.id → SYSTEM3(VOTED ∪ {id}, t unionmulti *v+))
VOTER3(id, c) = open→ arrive!id → vote.id.c→ (noreceipt.id → close→ Stop
! offerreceipt.id → (yes.id → write.id.c→ close→ Stop
$ no.id → close→ Stop))
voting phase. However, in the case of receipt-freeness, where
a coercer cannot communicate with the voter until after the
election, the voter does not obtain evidence of having voted
for the coercer’s preferred candidate: she can simply claim
that any appropriate vote from the bulletin board was hers.
Hence the system satisfies CR and CR∗ for IOK , but not for
IBT
4) Opt-num-receipt: Finally, we consider a cross between
Opt-receipt and Num-receipt. In this example, the voter
provides a number of their choice when they cast their vote,
as in Num-receipt. The system then nondeterministically
chooses whether or not to offer the voter the option of having
their vote and chosen value posted on the bulletin board. The
voter can accept or reject the offer.
This example provides receipt-freeness for the same rea-
sons as Num-receipt above. Furthermore, it is possible for
the voter to vote for their preferred candidate in a way
consistent with having followed the coercer’s instructions,
by claiming that the system did not offer the option of
posting the vote on the bulletin board. Thus this example
also meets CR(IBT ). However, it does not meet CR∗(IBT ):
it is possible for the voter to demonstrate she has complied
with the coercer’s instructions.
The four examples given in this section were presented to
highlight the differences between the different combinations
of the CR and CR∗ properties with IOK and IBT . A summary
of the properties they meet is presented in Figure 6.
V. RECEIPT FREENESS
As discussed in Section I-A, we consider receipt freeness
as a subclass of coercion resistance, in which a coercer
does not give instructions on how to vote, and is concerned
only with information leakage about how the vote was cast.
Appropriate instantiations of I will thus be dominated by
IOK . Each definition of coercion resistance gives rise to a
version of receipt freeness.
Definition 24 (Receipt freeness [RF)]): A system meets
RF(I,C,H) if it meets CR(I,C,H) and IOK dominates I.
Definition 25 (Receipt freeness [RF∗)]): A system meets
RF∗(I,C,H) if it meets CR∗(I,C,H) and IOK dominates I.
The following lemma establishes a sufficient condition for
both forms of receipt freeness:
Lemma 2: If, for any x, c ∈ C,
LH (SYSTEM ‖ VOTER(0, x) ‖ VOTER(1, c))
= FD LH (SYSTEM ‖ VOTER(0, c) ‖ VOTER(1, x))
then SYSTEM meets RF(IOK ,C,H) and RF∗(IOK ,C,H).
A. Deterministic voters
In many voting systems, the process of casting a vote for
a particular candidate is deterministic. For such systems , it
follows that IOK = IBT : once the instruction to vote for c is
given, no additional instructions are possible and the ability
to interact with the voter gives the coercer no additional
advantage.
However, note that IMAX might not be dominated by IBT ,
and so even in the case of deterministic voting, the coercion
resistance property CR(IMAX,C,H) or CR∗(IMAX,C,H) does
not always collapse to receipt freeness. Indeed, Preˆt a` Voter
provides an example of this: it allows randomisation attacks
even though the voting process is deterministic, and the
system is receipt-free.
VI. CONCLUSION
Definitions of coercion resistance and receipt freeness in
the literature are often imprecise, and even where formal
definitions are given, two definitions from two different
sources rarely coincide.
In this paper, we have constructed a framework for mod-
elling and analyzing coercion resistance and receipt freeness
properties in CSP. We have shown how several of the most
Figure 6 Properties satisfied by example voting protocols.
CR(IOK ,C,H) CR(IBT ,C,H) CR∗(IOK ,C,H) CR∗(IBT ,C,H)
Two-receipt X × × ×
Opt-receipt X X × ×
Num-receipt X × X ×
Opt-num-receipt X X X ×
Preˆt a` Voter X X X X
frequently used definitions in the literature can be encapsu-
lated within our setup, and we have given results that allow
two different definitions to be compared, and relationships
between them discovered. The only other attempt we are
aware of to provide a general framework is that of [2]. Their
approach provides characterisations of coercion resistance
and receipt freeness, as well as privacy. Broadly speaking,
they restrict attention only to the forms CR∗ and RF∗, and
their framework cannot handle randomization attacks (or
anything stronger than IBT ).
Our framework is rich enough to encompass a broad
range of definitions within the same setup, so that, using
our framework, one can model a system, and ask precisely
which notions of coercion resistance and receipt freeness it
satisfies. This has a distinct advantage that one can work
with a variety of definitions without translating the model
into several different notations.
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
The lemma states that if f is the identity function on events
outside H, and f−1(f (H)) = H, then LH (P) = Lf (H)(f (P)).
Proof:
We will make use of the following three laws of CSP. We
write ‘f\A’ to denote the projection of f onto domain š \ A.
1) If f−1(f (A)) = A and f\A is finite-to-one, then
(f\A)(P \ A) = f (P) \ f (A)
2) If f−1(f (A)) = A then
f (P ‖
A
Chaos(A)) = f (P) ‖
f (A)
Chaos(f (A))
3) f (Chaos(A)) = Chaos(f (A))
We are now ready to prove the lemma. The conditions
on f are that f\H = idΣ\H , the identity on š \ H; and that
f−1(f (H)) = H. The first condition implies that f\H is finite-
to-one (in fact 1-1), so the three laws are all applicable:
LH (P) = (P ‖
H
Chaos(H)) \ H
= (f\H )((P ‖
H
Chaos(H)) \ H)
= f (P ‖
H
Chaos(H)) \ f (H)
= (f (P) ‖
f (H)
f (Chaos(H))) \ f (H)
= (f (P) ‖
f (H)
Chaos(f (H))) \ f (H)
= Lf (H)(f (P))
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The theorem states that if I1 dominates I2, and SYSTEM
meets CR(I1,C,H), then SYSTEM also meets CR(I2,C,H).
Proof: If SYSTEM meets CR(I1,C,H), then for all c ∈
C and Zx1 ∈ I1, there exist some Zc .FD VOTER(0, c) and
Jx .FD J such that
LH (SYSTEM ‖ Zx1 ‖ J) -FD LH (SYSTEM ‖ Zc ‖ Jx)
(Recall that J = VOTER(1,C).)
We must show that this holds for I2 as well; that is, for all
c ∈ C and Zx2 ∈ I2, there exist some Zc .FD VOTER(0, c)
and Jx .FD J such that
LH (SYSTEM ‖ Zx2 ‖ J) -FD LH (SYSTEM ‖ Zc ‖ Jx)
Fix some c ∈ C and Zx2 ∈ I2. By the definition of
dominance, there is some Zx1 ∈ I1 such that Zx2 -FD Zx1 .
Since SYSTEM meets CR(I1,C,H), there exist some Zc .FD
VOTER(0, c) and Jx .FD J such that
LH (SYSTEM ‖ Zx1 ‖ J) -FD LH (SYSTEM ‖ Zc ‖ Jx)
But this choice of Zc and Jx will suffice to show that
SYSTEM also meets CR(I2,C,H). For since Zx2 -FD Zx1 ,
the monotonicity of the CSP operators tells us that
LH (SYSTEM ‖ Zx2 ‖ J) -FD LH (SYSTEM ‖ Zx1 ‖ J)
and so by the transitivity of refinement we also have
LH (SYSTEM ‖ Zx2 ‖ J) -FD LH (SYSTEM ‖ Zc ‖ Jx)
